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303 Comptes rendus
fondée sur les textes remis dans leur contexte d’origine. La pratique ascétique est certes 
peu compatible avec la possession d’esclaves ; encore faudrait-il démontrer que c’est bien 
elle que les auteurs étudiés, et en particulier Grégoire de Nysse, cherchent à étendre à 
l’ensemble de la société. Il semble bien plutôt que les arguments contre l’esclavage 
viennent de la réflexion sur la justice sociale, qui n’est pas nécessairement liée à une 
vie ascétique, laquelle est d’ailleurs loin d’être prouvée pour l’évêque de Nysse, tout 
comme pour Origène. Des entreprises plus modestes, consacrées aux textes eux-mêmes, 
comme les livres de S. Holman ou R. Klein déjà mentionnés, ou à une approche moins 
englobante, comme le récent volume de Ch. L. De Wet (The Unbound God: Slavery and 
the Formation of Early Christian Thought, London, New York, 2017), paraissent plus 
fructueux que la tentative trop peu structurée d’I. Ramelli.
Matthieu Cassin 
CNRS, IRHT
Frédéric Fauquier, Brigitte Pérez-Jean (éd.), Maxime de Tyr, entre rhétorique 
et philosophie au iie siècle de notre ère, Montpellier, Presses universitaires de la Médi-
terranée, 2016 (Mondes anciens), 214 p., ISBN : 978-2-36781-214-4.
Whole books devoted to the second-century philosophical (Platonist) orator 
Maximus of Tyre are not all that frequent, so when one does appear it is well worth 
pausing to ask what one might ideally hope from it. What are the really important 
questions to ask about his forty-one surviving discourses (‘dialexeis’), and how they can 
best be used to illuminate the larger issues that we care about in the thought and culture 
of the ancient world (or at least, the thought and culture of the Greek-speaking world of 
the early Imperial period)?
Two obvious answers would seem to follow simply from the label ‘philosophical 
orator’. If these are orations, what can examination of them tell us about the range of 
formal and stylistic options open to an orator of this period, and the extent to which 
they involved either perpetuating or departing from inherited classical patterns; does 
Maximus in his formal or stylistic choices present any notable features, or ones that 
stretch our sense of what was possible or accepted at the time? Equally obviously, if 
the themes of these orations are philosophical, what can they tell us about the state of 
philosophical thought and discourse in this period, which in the standard, broad-brush 
schema falls in between the heroic period of the foundation of the Hellenistic schools 
and the arrival of Neoplatonism – both in terms of the handling of particular questions 
and topics, and in terms of fashions for one or another overall doctrinal orientation? 
But this by no means exhausts the possibilities. One can ask fruitfully also about the 
interaction (is there any?) between the philosophical content and the formal and 
stylistic finish; about the idea of what philosophy as a whole is and does that is embodied 
in Maximus’ work, and how this conception compares and contrasts with those on view 
elsewhere in the panorama of the times; and (a special favourite of my own) one can ask 
about the overall project on which Maximus was engaged – what kind of intervention in 
the culture and society of his time do his surviving texts embody?
It is a merit of the present volume – ten essays of varying length edited (and 
contributed to) by Brigitte Pérez-Jean and Frédéric Fauquier – that it ranges over a 
good many of these possible lines of enquiry. Issues of oratorical style are tackled by 
Juan Luis López Crúces («  La répétition dans les séries énumératives chez Maxime 
de Tyr ») and Pierre Chiron (« Le style de Maxime sur Socrate à la lumière des idées 
hermogéniennes  »), and Maximus’s treatment of individual philosophical issues by 
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Paul Youm («  Contribution de Maxime de Tyr aux interprétations de la doctrine 
platonicienne de la réminiscence  »), Andrei Timotin («  Le discours de Maxime de 
Tyr sur la prière (Dissertatio V) dans la tradition platonicienne  ») and Joan-Antoine 
Mallet («  Note sur l’usage de la notion de theia moira chez Maxime de Tyr, Eschine 
de Sphettos et Platon  »). Three contributions focus on his attitude to and use of 
authorities from the classical canon: Fauquier on his idea of the task of the interpreter of 
Plato (« Maxime, interprète de Platon ? »), Panagiota Daouti on his conception and use 
of Homer (« Homère chez Maxime de Tyr »), and Lucia Saudelli on his engagement 
with the Presocratics (« Maxime de Tyr, les Présocratiques et le médioplatonisme »). 
Finally, a broader view of Maximus’ thematic preoccupations and overall project as a 
philosophical communicator is taken by Pérez-Jean («  Accords et désaccords chez 
Maxime de Tyr ») and Javier Campos Daroca (« Maxime de Tyr, Socrate et les discours 
selon la philosophie »).
What is a shade disappointing, however, is the relative lack of ambition shown by 
many, probably the majority of these contributions. They all of them have something 
well-conceived and intelligent to say, but few of them push this to the point of proposing 
any very substantial or decisive conclusions. Of the treatments of philosophical subject-
matter, both Youm’s and Mallet’s – and one might add here Fauquier’s on concepts of 
Platonic exegesis – offer elegant surveys, but with relatively little detail of how what we find 
in Maximus might relate interestingly to a larger synchronic or diachronic perspective. 
It is left to Timotin, on prayer as a philosophical topic, to show what such a project of 
relating Maximus’ treatment to precursors, contemporaries and successors in the debate 
might look like; and even he ends his contribution without any final summary to draw 
conclusions and indicate what difference getting a clear view of Maximus’ individual take 
on the issue might make. Much the same is true of the other two treatments of classical 
points of reference, by Daouti and Saudelli. Both of them are competently descriptive, 
but neither really explains what, if anything, might be interesting about Maximus’ use of 
and engagement with either Homer or the Presocratics in a comparative perspective, or 
grounds its own contribution in a critical overview of existing scholarship on its topic. 
Saudelli, it is true, does offer the observation that of all the Presocratics it is Pherecydes 
who seems to play a foreground role in Maximus’ text. But given that the basis for 
this is a grand total of three brief references, it is not overwhelmingly convincing; one 
might counter-propose that, in view of the colourful material that Maximus might 
have exploited (anecdotes of Thales, Pythagoras and Empedocles; the gnomic riches of 
Democritus) what is in fact remarkable is how modest a place the Presocratics occupy 
in his field of view, and how heavily mediated by their uptake by intermediate sources. 
Turning to the treatments of the verbal and stylistic finish of the Dialexeis, one again 
finds promising thoughts and interesting analysis cut short too soon. Lopez Crúces offers 
precise and circumstantial analysis of the enumerative style that is indeed such a striking 
and distinctive feature of Maximus’ verbal texture, with some welcome statistics, and 
rightly observes that it is a characteristic that suggests careful written composition rather 
than the improvisation in live performance that has sometimes been seen as the origin 
of our text. But once more, where is the larger perspective – if this is what is distinctive 
of Maximus, where then do we place him in our larger stories of oratorical style and 
modes of philosophical communication? It is all the more disappointing not to be told 
in that Lopez Crúces himself comments on the ‘near poeticism’ of some of Maximus’ 
enumerative sequences; surely this is an invitation to relate him to the longer story of 
the negotiations of prose oratory with verse that runs, in his own era and subsequently, 
through the works of (at least) Dio Chrysostom, Aelius Aristides and Himerius. Pierre 
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Chiron, for his part, advances the intriguing proposal of reading Maximus – in the 
specific example of the ending of Or. 3, on Socrates’ (supposed) refusal to defend himself 
in court – in the light of the rhetor Hermogenes’ stylistic categories (‘forms’, ideai); but 
he allows himself the luxury of stopping with a brief preliminary sketch, in which the 
proposal is made, but not developed in any detail or tested with any rigour. It remains 
only a guess that semnotes might be the appropriate Hermogenic category to apply to 
the final paragraph of the oration, and a good deal of contrary evidence (for instance, 
Hermogenes’ insistence that semnotes demands generalization rather than particularity) 
is simply sidestepped.
Of the two contributors who tackle overall issues of sensibility and strategy, Pérez-
Jean is the briefer and more allusive, meditating in broadly Heraclitean vein on various 
aspects of unity and diversity at play in the Dialexeis. The really purposeful and coherent 
discussion – indeed probably the most ambitious and successful in the whole volume – is 
Campos Daroca’s reading of the whole surviving corpus of Maximus’ work as a sustained 
and conscious exercise in philosophical protreptic, centred on the model of Socrates, 
and involving theoretical reflection as well as practical performance. The protreptic 
tone of much of Maximus’ discourse is not in doubt, particularly – in good preacher’s 
style – towards the end of each individual oration, but also (though Campos Daroca 
does not choose to dwell on this particular aspect) more systematically in the very first 
piece in the collection. Equally, I think it is quite right that Maximus is attempting, at 
least some of the time, to live up in his own performance to the theoretical standards 
of inspiring philosophical discourse that he articulates in Or. 22 and 25. And it is also 
right to underline the central importance of Socrates to the Dialexeis, not only as an 
illuminating focus for discussion and a key moral exemplar, but also (with whatever 
degree of mediation through his literary representations) a stylistic model. I do however 
have some reservations about the closeness with which Campos Daroca wishes to draw 
these elements together, and about the overall picture of Maximus’ communicative 
intentions that emerges.
That Socrates can serve directly in some cases as a model for protreptic utterance, 
on the strength of the Apology, the closing pages of the Gorgias, and, above all, the 
Clitophon, is clear: we see how this works itself out, as Campos Daroca observes, in Dio 
Chrysostom’s Or. 13. But although Socrates’s activity as a teacher (and protector) of the 
young is acknowledged by Maximus, he is not normally in the Dialexeis presented as a 
protreptic preacher, or indeed any kind of orator; the focus is much more regularly on 
his status as moral paragon, example of enlightened virtue in action. There is indeed a 
Socratic register included in the range of styles Maximus brings into play, but this is a 
matter of turns of phrase echoed from Socratic dialogue, not of protreptic flow. I thus 
doubt that it is Socrates that Maximus has uniquely, or even primarily, in mind when he 
constructs his models of ideal philosophical eloquence in Or. 22 and 25, or depicts the 
ideal philosophical preacher in Or. 1. On the larger point about Maximus’ overall project 
in the Dialexeis, I am not wholly convinced by Campos Daroca’s conclusion that we can 
see here a genuine, first-order exercise in philosophical protreptic – that is to say (if this 
is not putting words into his mouth) a work by a philosophical professional, deliberately 
simplifying his discourse in the interests of more effective communication. On the one 
hand, I think that the question of the depth of Maximus’ philosophical knowledge and 
expertise is a more open one than that, and on the other (as I have perhaps tried to say 
too often in print already), I think it is possible to see Maximus’ project more as one of 
the domestication and containment of philosophy than as a straightforward crusade for 
its propagation. 
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There is clearly much more that could be said on both sides of this issue. I close 
instead with the thought that it is on this level of discussion, which Campos Darocas’ 
essay takes us to more clearly and constructively that most of the others in the present 
collection, that some of the best hopes for future scholarship on Maximus and his 
idiosyncratic products seem to me to lie.
Michael Trapp
King’s College London
michael.trapp@kcl.ac.uk
